I was surprised this weekend to find an essay about Proust by Emmanuel Levinas. I pulled Proper Names off the shelf to glance through it, I’m not sure why, and saw that one of the last essays in the book was about Proust. I must have read it when I first read the book in 1998, but I had completely forgotten about it.
Levinas’s essay is short, only 5 pages, but by no means slight. It’s not at all surprising that in it Levinas recapitulates many of the themes so central to his philosophy, particularly the notions of alterity and the Other around which his phenomenology has been built, but there is also an interesting moment when he mentions the “moral rules [which] banished enchantments from the world more harshly than did the laws of nature. (101)” This reads like a section from one of his Talmudic readings.
At the start of his essay Levinas confronts the problem of Proust’s reception, particularly with regard to the generation which came of age between the Wars. Levinas makes the point that Proust’s reputation went into decline during this period in France: that his subject matter was not appreciated as it should have been (Levinas calls him “the new Saint-Simon of a nobility sans Versailles” (99)), that his novels were not stirringly heroic, and, most damningly, that his analyses were eventually seen to be without merit, in other words, that his psychology was flawed. Levinas responds to this final criticism by taking it further and scolding those for whom truth is the subject of art. “The theory of the scientist or philosopher” may be judged on its relation to the object it seeks to describe, but, according to Levinas, that of the artist cannot be, for the object described is in fact the object created. The reasoning of the artist, like anything else in their work, “like images or symbols, is meant to produce a certain rhythm in which the reality sought after will magically appear” (100). He clearly reads Proust’s novel as the exemplary reminder that the self and reality are separate from each other, that the pain and joy of living are always also reflected upon and refracted through other experience. Being human means being reflective and that each human is unique and mysterious because of differences in their reflections. “The power of being to be incomparably more than it is does not derive from I know not what symbolic function it would take on, nor from a dynamism that would unfold it into a becoming, but from its infinite sparkle under the reflective gaze. (101)”
But the bulk of “The Other in Proust” is spent making the argument that Proust manages to capture two essential aspects of the human condition, for out of the lack of correspondence between the object and the artist’s description of it which Levinas describes come conclusions about the impossiblity of the kind of fusion in connection that Proust also excludes from his universe. It’s easy to see, and criticize, in Proust’s novel the notion that love is reduced to jealousy, and jealousy of the most abject kind. Levinas sees something else, though. He sees a real love, and a recognition in Proust, that what keeps us alive for each other is our alterity, our mysterious difference. It is the Other we love, and Levinas argues that Proust captures the ways in which love is kept alive not by an impossible fusion, but by the reminder that fusion is impossible. “That is Eros in all its ontological purity,…direct relationship with what gives itself in withholding itself, with the other qua other, with mystery. (103)”
But of course the role of love in In Search of Lost Time is ultimately only to remind us of our relation to ourselves; our reflections upon our own thoughts and feelings are as jealously shepherded and questioned as are our lovers. Being alone with ourselves is like being alone with another (yet another reason why the structure of Proust’s novel, between autobiography and invention, is so brilliant). Here is the last paragraph from Levinas’s essay:
Thus the theme of solitude in Proust takes on a new meaning. Its event is in its conversion into communication. Its despair is an inexhaustible source of hope. A paradoxical conception, in a civilization that, despite the progress made since the Eleatics, sees in unity the very apotheosis of being. But Proust’s most profound teaching–if indeed poetry teaches–consists in situating the real in relation with what for ever remains other–with the other as absence and mystery. It consists in rediscovering this relation also within the very intimacy of the I and in inaugurating a dialectic that breaks definitively with Parmenides.